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Explanations and the Preponderance Standard: Still
Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo
We both were friends with and deep admirers of Craig Callen. One of
us (Allen) knew Craig from the beginning, as it were, and co-authored a
number of articles with him.1 For the other (Pardo), Craig was not only a
friend but also a mentor. He was a wonderful person, always cheerful even
in the face of tragic adversity, humble and understated in his personal
interactions, and an acute analyst in his scholarship, a scholarship that all too
tragically was cut short.
Craig’s early paper on the limits of Bayesian inference2 was
pathbreaking, and deeply affected the work that we both do today. He was
an early cheerleader and critic of the precursors to the relative plausibility
theory,3 and at a very early date he identified the issue that this present
manuscript develops into a full-length treatment,4 which is the problem of
evidentiary thresholds. He was right to focus attention on this issue, as he
also did on arguments and language in our work that were either in need of
correction or refinement.
We thank Michael Risinger for unearthing this work-in-progress, which
to a considerable extent is an elaboration on his brief comment on one of our
early articles, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson, and we are grateful to once
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Ronald J. Allen & Craig R. Callen, The Juridical Management of Factual Uncertainty,
7 INT’L. J. EVID. & PROOF 1 (2003); Ronald J. Allen & Craig R. Callen, Teaching “Bloody
Instructions”: Civil Presumptions and the Lessons of Isomorphism, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
933 (2003).
2
Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian
Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1 (1982). Another important strand in Callen’s
scholarship is his illuminating work on cognitive science, speech-act theory, and hearsay. See
Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1994).
3
Craig R. Callen, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A Comment on Professor Allen’s
Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 423 (1991).
4
Id. at 432; Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of “Sufficiency of
the Evidence” Tests, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1113 (1991).
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again have the opportunity to engage with Craig’s thoughts.5 It is
unfortunate that his paper, which was written approximately ten years ago,
could not have been written today with the benefits of knowing the
developments over the last decade. Not because those developments would
have necessarily changed his mind on any of the issues he is addressing, but
rather because we regret the loss of his incisive commentary on the present
state of thought on the relevant issues. As it stands, the Article is certainly
right to focus on the threshold issue, but as we will briefly show, it does not
address the present state of the literature. However, it is a very useful vehicle
to elaborate on certain aspects of the relative plausibility theory to show how
the best understanding of it at least responds to if not completely resolves the
complex set of issues that Craig raises. It is in that spirit, with deep
appreciation for his once more having forced us to think hard about difficult
issues, and deep regret for not being able to get his reactions to our thoughts,
that we present this comment.
Our theory of juridical proof explains the process of proof in terms of
the relative plausibility of competing explanations.6 The theory is the
primary competitor to more robustly probabilistic explanations that conceive
of standards of proof as probabilistic thresholds (for example, that the
preponderance standards means proof beyond 0.5, with higher standards
requiring higher thresholds). The explanatory account shares the same ends
or goals as probabilistic approaches, which have to do with various policy
judgments about the likelihood of disputed facts and allocating the risk of
error between the parties.7 According to the explanatory account, the law
implements these policies through a process in which fact-finders evaluate
the relative plausibility of explanations, rather than by trying to attach
5
Craig R. Callen, Spotting a Preponderance of the Evidence in the Wild: Inference to
the Best Explanation and Sufficiency of the Evidence, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1517 (2018).
See supra note 3.
6
Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27
LAW & PHIL. 223 (2008). This is the primary article that Craig discusses in his manuscript.
Explanations and explanatory reasoning (i.e., “abduction”) provide the epistemological
foundation to the theory first developed by Prof. Allen, which focused on the relative
plausibility of stories. Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 604, 606 (1994); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 373 (1991). We each discuss aspects of the theory in our other contributions to this
symposium. See Ronald J. Allen, The Declining Utility of Analyzing Burdens of Persuasions,
48 SETON HALL L. REV. 995 (2018); Michael S. Pardo, Epistemology, Psychology, and
Standards of Proof: An Essay on Risinger’s “Surprise” Theory, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1039
(2018). We present only a very brief sketch in this response. In a forthcoming article, we
discuss the theory in detail and respond to recent criticisms. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael
S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics (in progress)(on file with authors).
7
In the civil context, under the preponderance standard, these policies include the
accuracy of outcomes and treating the parties equally with regard to the risk of error. See
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 391 (1983).
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numbers to beliefs (as under most probabilistic accounts). The two primary
differences between our account and the more conventional probabilistic
accounts are, first, the criteria that are central to the fact-finding process
(explanatory vs. probabilistic), and, second, whether the proof process is
characterized as comparative or not. Unlike the conventional probabilistic
accounts, the explanatory account is inherently comparative—whether an
explanation satisfies the standard will depend on the strength of the possible
explanations supporting each side.8 Under the “preponderance of the
evidence” standard, fact-finders determine whether the best of the available
explanations favors the plaintiff or the defendant.9 The best available
explanation will favor the plaintiff if it includes all of the legal elements of
the plaintiff’s claim; it will favor the defendant when it fails to include one
of more elements.10
Although, like us, Craig also rejects probabilistic approaches to
standards of proof11, he challenges what he sees as the comparative aspect of
our account. Focusing on the preponderance standard, he argues that relative
plausibility has trouble explaining some aspects of how the standard operates
(1) at trial and (2) in the contexts of summary judgment and judgments as a
matter of law. In both contexts, his central point of criticism is the same:
jurors and judges may reject a plaintiff’s explanation while simultaneously
thinking that it is better than the defendant’s (which may be implausible or
non-existent).12 For the reasons we clarify below, however, relative
8
In other words, under the explanatory account, the fundamental issue is whether X or
Y is more plausible; under the probabilistic interpretation, the fundamental issue is whether
X or not-X is more probable (with X and not-X summing to 1).
9
See, e.g., Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521-22 (7th Cir. 2005) (comparing
explanations); Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1994)
(same); Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). In the context of
summary judgment, the Supreme Court has likewise emphasized the relative plausibility of
explanations. See Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 437 (2002) (“Neither the
Court of Appeals, nor respondents, nor the dissent provides any reason to question the city’s
theory. In particular, they do not offer a competing theory, let alone data . . .”); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Higher standards of proof
accordingly require higher explanatory thresholds; parties with the burden of proof must do
more than offer a better explanation than the alternative(s). See Pardo & Allen, Juridical
Proof, supra note 6; Pardo, supra note 6 (explaining the relationship between explanations
and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard).
10
This assumes the plaintiff has the burden the proof; the analysis reverses for issues
(such as affirmative defenses) in which the defendant has the burden of proof. An explanation
will “include” an element if the element is a part of, or is entailed by, the explanation. For
example, in a negligence case, the plaintiff’s explanation must include each of the elements
of a negligence claim under the applicable substantive law; if the better explanation fails to
include an element (e.g., causation), then the defendant will win.
11
Callen, supra note 5, at 1524–32 (summarizing “the reasons for skepticism about
mathematical models”).
12
Callen, supra note 5, at 1523 (arguing that having a better explanation is a “necessary”
but not “sufficient” requirement for warranting a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor). Callen,
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plausibility accommodates the features that Craig discusses and explains
how they fit into the process of proof. We focus first on decisions by factfinders at trial and then discuss summary judgment and judgment as a matter
of law.
At trial, relative plausibility explains the decision threshold in civil
cases under the preponderance standard as whether the best of the available
explanations favors the plaintiff or the defendant. Craig demurs, arguing that
having a better explanation is necessary but not sufficient for the plaintiff to
meet the burden of proof.13 He makes two points in support of this position.
First, some jury instructions are not phrased in terms of comparisons, but
rather appear to require an assessment of the plaintiff’s case and its
negation.14 Second, jurors may employ a “default rule” and conclude that
the plaintiff’s evidence and explanation are not “sufficiently
comprehensive,” even though they may think the defendant’s alternative
case is weaker.15 Craig interprets our theory to require a finding for the
plaintiff in such cases, even though he thinks jurors may reasonably conclude
that the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof.16
Relative plausibility, however, can account for both of these points.
Regarding jury instructions, it important to first clarify that there is wide
variation on jury instructions on the preponderance standard (and other
standards): some appear to use non-comparative language, some explicitly
use comparative language, and others are ambiguous.17 More importantly,
as we have discussed, even when instructions use non-comparative language
when discussing the standard of proof, (1) fact-finders have no choice but to
consider alternatives when assessing the likelihood of disputed facts, and (2)

supra note 5 at 1520 (arguing that our theory “would require jurors to find in favor of the
party with the burden of proof when the best explanation favored that party, even though the
jurors considered that explanation (or the evidence that supported it) insufficient to warrant a
verdict.”). Callen, supra note 5, at 1520 (arguing that the standard for summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law “permits the court to enter judgment against the non-moving
party for insufficiency of evidence without considering evidence and explanations in favor of
the moving party.”).
13
Callen, supra note 5, at 1523, 1549–50, 1564–68.
14
Callen, supra note 5, at 1519–20.
15
Callen, supra note 5, at 1549 (arguing that, in addition to being better than those that
favor the defendant, the plaintiff’s explanation must also be “sufficiently comprehensive to
overcome reluctance to abandon the default rule stemming from absence of evidence or
doubts about the quality of explanations in favor of the burden-bearing party.”).
16
Callen, supra note 5, at 1564 (arguing that our theory is “in conflict” with research on
reasoning “that suggests that decision makers may validly adhere to default rules (such as
finding in favor of the party that does not bear the burden of persuasion) when evidence is too
thin to justify a different decision.”).
17
See John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil
Proof, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1569, 1571-76 (2015) (surveying differences in jury instructions on
the preponderance standard).
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several other aspects of the process encourage the development of
alternatives.18 The process is inherently comparative regardless of what the
instruction on the standard of proof says—a fact confirmed by the empirical
evidence on jury behavior.19
Craig appears to accept that the proof process is comparative20, but he
then raises his second point: better explanations are necessary but not
sufficient. Relative plausibility, however, has an answer here as well.
Although it is certainly true that the proof process depends to a large extent
on the parties to identify facts to prove or dispute, to gather and present
evidence, and to formulate explanations of the evidence and events—and the
legal system will largely defer to such choices21—nothing in our account
requires fact-finders to limit their decision-making choices to the parties’
explanations.22 Similarly, nothing in our account requires parties to identify
specific explanations on which to rely.23 As a matter of fact, they will often
do so,24 but they may also choose to present their cases in a variety of
18
See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in Plausible
Reasoning, 21 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 133 (2017).
19
See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law”
in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. L. REV. 1537, 1605
(2012); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN
JURIES: THE VERDICT 135 (2007).
20
Callen supra note 5, at 5 (“it is undoubtedly true that jurors, who are at least outwardly
passive, often rely heavily on the parties’ gathering of evidence and formulation of theories,
or explanations of the evidence. When jurors have no reason to question the adequacy of the
evidence or of the hypotheses that the parties have constructed to explain the evidence, then
it makes perfect sense for jurors to compare those hypotheses in the process of reaching their
decision.”)
21
See, e.g., Carrillo v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1213 (D.N.M.
2016) (“Plaintiffs are, of course, the masters of their litigation strategy, and may pursue
litigation as they choose.”); United States v. Hock Chee Koo, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124 (D.
Or. 2011) (“the government is the master of its evidence and may, ‘by deciding what [it] offers
it to prove, . . . control what will be required to satisfy the authentication requirement.’”)
(quoting WRIGHT & GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 7104 (2000)).
22
This was first noted in Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil
Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 929 (2004) (“the actual
practice of civil litigation encourages the parties to formulate alternative hypotheses, over
which a choice is made (or from which a choice is fashioned)”); id. at 938 (“a story
constructed in light of the parties [stories]”); id. at 938, n. 167 (“The possibility of fact finder
creativity in determining what happened is not a problem for the relative plausibility theory,
as what matters is story formation”).
23
Our account is distinct from the “story model” of juror decision-making. Pennington
& Hastie, supra note 19. The latter is a psychological account of juror behavior and, unlike
our account, it does not provide an account of standards of proof and other aspects of the proof
process. For discussion of the differences between the accounts, see Michael S. Pardo, The
Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 598–99 (2013).
24
See Reid Hastie, What’s the Story? Explanations and Narratives in Civil Jury
Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23,
31 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008) (“One observation, from years of study of stories at

PARDOALLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1584

8/10/2018 11:06 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1579

alternative ways. In other words, as we have explained, the scope of
“explanations” in our account is much broader than Craig’s interpretation
appears to assume.25 Parties may sometimes proceed, or defend, by offering
disjunctive explanations, general explanations, or in some cases by invoking
all of the possibilities that may support them without identifying a specific
alternative.26 Thus, in the extreme examples that Craig suggests (i.e., weak
plaintiff cases with no defense alternatives), our account allows for decisions
by jurors to reject all of the offered explanations. In such cases, jurors may
formulate their own explanation of what they think most likely occurred, but
they are not required to do that either. They may simply conclude
“something else must have happened” or “we have no idea what happened”
and find against the party with the burden of proof.27 On the other hand,
even plaintiff cases and explanations that appear weak in the abstract may
become considerably more plausible when compared with the alternative
possibilities and, thus, fact-finders may accordingly find for plaintiffs in such
cases.28 Relative plausibility accommodates each of these possibilities and
the various points that Craig raises about proof at trial.
Craig also focuses on “sufficiency of evidence” in the context of
summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law.29 The standard in
each of these contexts is the same: whether, construing the evidence and
drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury
could find for the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence.30 Craig
trial, is that the defense perspective is more complicated and usually involves at least two
stories: the story of the defendant’s activities and a second story to account for the events that
led to the lawsuit.”); THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS,
POWERFUL WORDS: STORYTELLING & PERSUASION TECHNIQUES FOR COMMUNICATING YOUR
THEORY OF THE DEFENSE (2016).
25
See Michael S. Pardo, Group Agency and Legal Proof; Or, Why the Jury is an “It,”
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1839–51 (2015) (discussing different types of explanations);
Pardo, supra note 23.
26
See Pardo, supra note 25.
27
Pardo & Allen, supra note 6, at 238 (“If the proffered explanations truly are equally
bad . . . judgment will (and should) go against the party with the burden of persuasion.”). In
some of the early papers first beginning the exploration of alternatives to probabilistic
reasoning, Prof. Allen presented the nature of juridical proof as a choice between what the
parties advanced. See Allen, supra note 6, at 409. But even at the early date it was recognized
that a verdict could be for a defendant even when the defendant had presented no evidence “if
the fact finder concludes that any story told by the defendant would be more plausible than
the plaintiff’s.” See Allen, supra note 6, at 412.
28
See, e.g., Bammerlin, 30 F.3d at 902 (“[Plaintiff] proceeded by eliminating the
alternatives . . . [Plaintiff] produced evidence that could lead a rational jury to eliminate the
hypotheses inconsistent with his favored theory, which in turn permits an inference that his
hypothesis is true.”). See also Anderson, 397 F.3d at 521 (“[I]f in a particular case all the
alternatives are ruled out, we can be confident that the case presents one of those instances in
which [a] rare event did occur.”)
29
FED. R. CIV. P. 56, 50.
30
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
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contends that our account has trouble explaining this standard because (1)
defendants moving for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law
need not offer any counter evidence or alternative explanations, and (2) he
interprets our account to require that defendants do so.31 As we have
clarified in subsequent work, however, our account does not require
defendants to provide either evidence or explanations, and relative
plausibility explains the standard in a straightforward manner.32 To say that
no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff (by a preponderance) is to say
that no reasonable jury, construing the evidence and drawing reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, could find the plaintiff’s explanation to
be the best available explanation.33 This may be the case because the
plaintiff’s explanation is implausible (regardless of the contrary
possibilities), or it may be the case that no reasonable jury could find for the
plaintiff because, based on the plaintiff’s evidence, there is an obvious,
alternative explanation that is just as good or better than the plaintiff’s.34 In
neither case is the defendant required to proffer evidence, and courts may

477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment depends on whether
“reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled
to a verdict”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (explaining
that the standard for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the summary-judgment standard).
This assumes that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue and that the preponderance
standard applies. When the defendant has the burden on the issue, then the issue is whether a
reasonable jury could find for the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Parties with
the burden may also move for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law—in such
cases, the standard is whether a reasonable jury must find for the moving party. Reeves, 530
U.S. at 150.
31
Callen, supra note 5, at 44 (“If the standard of proof asked whether the plaintiff’s story
was better than the defendant’s, then Celotex would require the defendant to offer some
affirmative evidence”). See also id. at 40 (“Directed verdicts and summary judgments are
two of the procedural means by which courts decide that a party’s evidence is simply not good
enough”).
32
See Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil
Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451 (2010) (discussing the standards for summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law in explanatory terms). And again even the early work on relative
plausibility noted the creative role of the fact finder. See supra notes 22, 27.
33
See Pardo, supra note 24, at 1484–85.
34
See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88 (concluding the plaintiff’s evidence was
insufficient to survive summary judgment because (1) the plaintiff’s theory was “implausible”
and “made no economic sense,” and (2) plaintiff’s evidence was more likely explained by
independent conduct (which would not give rise to liability)). See also Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 468–69 (1992). Similar considerations apply in the
pleading context. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567–68 (2007) (concluding
the plaintiff’s explanation was not plausible because “here we have an obvious alternative
explanation”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (concluding that the plaintiff’s
explanation was not plausible “given more likely explanations” including an “obvious
alternative”). See also Pardo, supra note 31, at 1483–84; Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy,
Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and
Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2010).
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consider alternative explanations whether or not defendants advance them.
The two employment-discrimination cases that Craig discusses, St.
Mary’s and Reeves, illustrate the points we have made above.35 Rather than
presenting counterexamples, they in fact fit with, and are explained by,
relative plausibility. These cases provide excellent examples because they
each involve both fact-finding at trial and motions for judgments as a matter
of law (one by the plaintiff and one by the defendant).36
In St. Mary’s, the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged from his job
as a correctional officer because of his race.37 At trial, the plaintiff
established a prima facie case of discrimination, and then the defendant
offered an alternative, non-discriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff: rules
violations.38 During a bench trial, the court concluded that the defendant’s
stated reason for firing the plaintiff was not the real reason, but nevertheless
found that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff was discharged because of his race.39 The plaintiff argued
before the United States Supreme Court that when the fact-finder rejects the
defendant’s stated explanation for its actions (as was the case here), the
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Court disagreed,
holding that a prima facie case of discrimination plus rejecting the
defendant’s explanation might “permit” a reasonable fact-finder to find for
the plaintiff, but this result is not mandated as a matter of law.40 In other
words, it is also possible, based on the specific facts and evidence, for a
reasonable jury to reject the defendant’s explanation and also conclude that
the plaintiff has not proven discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence. This result and the analysis fit perfectly with the explanatory
structure of relative plausibility. In explanatory terms, a plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law (or summary judgment) only when a
reasonable jury must find the plaintiff’s explanation to be better than those
that favor the defendant. Such a result was not mandated in St. Mary’s
because a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the defendant’s
explanation is false, and yet, the plaintiff’s explanation was not better than
those that favor the defendant, such as discharge for a reason other than race
or as was the case in St. Mary’s, rules violations.41 Fact-finders are free to
35
Callen, supra note 5, at 42–45. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993);
Reeves v. Sanderson, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
36
These cases are discussed in more detail in Pardo, supra note 32, at 1505–08.
37
509 U.S. at 504–05.
38
The defendant conceded that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case under the
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973).
St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 506.
39
Id. at 508.
40
Id. at 511.
41
See id. at 509–11.
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reject the explanations offered by both sides, and that appears to be what the
fact-finder did in this case.42
Similar considerations apply to Reeves. The plaintiff alleged that he
was discharged from his job as a supervisor at a manufacturing plant because
of his age.43 At trial, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.44 The
defendant argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
the plaintiff’s prima facie case, plus evidence discrediting the defendant’s
alternative explanation, was an insufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.45 The United States
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, because, as the Court
pointed out, it will always depend of the details of the case. The evidence
sufficient to establish a prima facie case may, in fact, be quite persuasive,
even if only put initially to this preliminary use, and when coupled with
discrediting the defendant’s explanation, the entire evidentiary package
could easily lead to a reasonable conclusion of liability.46 As with St.
Mary’s, the result and the analysis fit with relative plausibility: in accepting
the plaintiff’s prima facie case and rejecting the defendant’s explanation, a
reasonable jury could find age to be the best available explanation for the
discharge.
To end where we began, we are indebted to Craig Callen and his
memory in more ways than we can articulate. Were he still with us, he would
undoubtedly be now preparing to explain, once again, where we have erred,
but, unlike most of us, without a hint of exasperation as to why he had not
been fully understood. He would just patiently try again to make his points
clear, and indeed would probably not only suggest but believe (wrongly as it
usually turned out) that the fault lie with him rather than his interlocutors.
We are also indebted to Michael Risinger for resurrecting Craig’s
manuscript. It is hard to imagine a more fitting way to bring to a close a
symposium dedicated to the achievements of one important scholar than by
reminding us of those of another.

42

As Callen acknowledges. See Callen, supra note 5, at 43 (“St. Mary’s seems to be a
good example of a case in which a fact finder worked out a story on his own”).
43
St. Mary’s, 530 U.S. at 137–38.
44
Id. at 139.
45
Id. at 137.
46
Id. at 151–53.

